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Abstract
This paper argues that Iceland enjoyed essential shelter, for its development 
and prosperity, provided by Denmark and Britain. Societal relations with 
Copenhagen were of  fundamental importance in the preservation and 
evolution of  Icelandic identity and culture, providing the foundation of  the 
modern society and leading to the establishment of  the Icelandic state. Danish 
financial backups created the basis for the island’s economic prosperity in the 
20th century. Moreover, Denmark provided partial political shelter in terms 
of  significant diplomatic support in guaranteeing trade agreements with other 
states. Also, Denmark led by example and Iceland followed its foreign policy. 
On the other hand, Denmark failed to provide Iceland with protection of  its 
land and waters and economic cover when it was in most need. Moreover, the 
economic cover it did provide was, at times, highly costly. Denmark had been 
downgraded to a small European power in the post-Napoleonic period. In 
practice, Britain was in control over the North Atlantic. It guaranteed Iceland’s 
neutrality and connection to the outside world and markets when the Danish 
authorities failed in these areas, as long as British interests were also served. 
Nor did British protection come without cost. Accordingly, this paper confirms 
the common claim of  small-state studies that small states are at the mercy of  
their larger neighbours. Moreover, our findings indicate that Iceland’s growing 
autonomy did not affect its need for political, economic and societal cover. 
Keywords: Iceland; small states; shelter; Denmark; Britain.
Icelandic Review of Politics and Administration Vol 11, Issue 2 (187–206)
© 2015 Contact: Baldur Thorhallsson, baldurt@hi.is
Article first published online December 17th 2015 on http://www.irpa.is
Publisher: Institute of Public Administration and Politics, Gimli, Sæmundargötu 1, 101 Reykjavík, Iceland 
Stjórnmál & stjórnsýsla 2. tbl. 11. árg. 2015(187-206) Fræðigreinar 
© 2015 Tengiliður: Baldur Thorhallsson, baldurt@hi.is 
Vefbirting 17. desember 2015 - Birtist á vefnum http://www.irpa.is 
Útgefandi: Stofnun stjórnsýslufræða og stjórnmála, Gimli, Sæmundargötu 1, 101 Reykjavík 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13177/irpa.a.2015.11.2.4




Iceland’s External Affairs from the 
Napoleonic Era to the Occupation of 
Denmark: Danish and British shelter 
Introduction
This paper is the fourth in a ‘hexalogy’ (a series of  six) that examines Iceland’s foreign 
relations from the time of  Settlement to the present day. It will cover part of  the ‘Danish 
period’ from 1815, at the end of  the Napoleonic wars, until 1940 when Danish-Icelandic 
relations were severed by the German occupation of  Denmark. The previous three pa-
pers have examined ‘the Norwegian Period’ (from the Settlement to 1400), ‘the English 
and German Periods’ (from c. 1400 to the Reformation in the mid-16th century) and the 
first part of  the ‘Danish Period’ until the end of  the Napoleonic era (see Þórhallsson 
2012; Þórhallsson & Kristinsson 2013; Þórhallsson & Joensen 2014). 
These studies build on an assumption from the International Relations literature that 
small states/entities are uniquely vulnerable, economically and politically. They cannot 
defend themselves and the smallness of  their domestic markets makes them reliant on 
access to larger markets in order to flourish. This makes small states more vulnerable to 
external, as well as internal, shocks, as there are few domestic buffers that can absorb the 
burden of  economic and political shocks (Katzenstein 1984). 
The assumption has been taken further by the shelter theory which claims that small 
states/entities need political, economic and societal shelter provided by their larger 
neighbours and/or international organizations in order to prosper, domestically, and 
thrive in the international system (Thorhallssosn 2011). The aim of  these studies is 
to examine whether the expectations of  shelter theory address the reality of  Iceland’s 
external relations through history. Also, the papers make an attempt to test shelter theory 
on the case of  Iceland – an entity which developed from being a peripheral outpost in 
Europe to a modern state at the centre of  attention by superpowers in the post-WWII 
period. 
The previous papers lay out how the shelter theory can be applied to a sovereign 
small state in the international system and small peripheral entities within a state 
(the periphery and the core). The case of  Iceland fits perfectly into the picture of  a 
vulnerable small dependency, and Rokkan and Urwin’s (1983) three types of  transitions 
which construct the centre-periphery relations model in how the periphery is dependent 
upon the centre, i.e. concerning economy, politics and culture. Moreover, their three key 
characteristics of  peripheries which distinguish them from the centre (distance, difference 
and dependence) place Icelandic-Danish relations in a new light. Furthermore, shelter 
theory has, for instance, been used to analyze the shelter options available to Scotland 
and the costs and benefits of  staying in a union with the UK or becoming independent 
(Bailes, Thorhallsson & Johnstone 2013). As the current study and previous studies 
show, Iceland sought shelter in non-Danish actors against the wishes of  Denmark. 
Therefore, Iceland is an entity that seeks benefits from Denmark but when it cannot get 
those benefits, it seeks them from other actors that can provide them. Hence, Iceland’s 
relations with Denmark is one of  benefits and costs for both actors, it was not just the 
Danish exploitation of  Iceland as the traditional historical narrative claims.
The shelter theory mainly addresses three interrelated issues: reduction of  risk before 






cleaning up after the event. There are three categories of  shelter: economic, political and 
societal. Economic shelter may take the form of  direct economic assistance, help from 
an external financial authority, a common market, favourable market access, etc. Political 
shelter consists of  direct and visible diplomatic or military backing by other states or 
international organizations. Also, political shelter can be in the form of  beneficial norms 
and rules of  the international system for small entities/states (Thorhallsson 2011). 
The consideration of  societal shelter is based on Rokkan and Urwin’s (1983) account 
of  the importance of  centre-periphery relationships in state-building in Western Europe. 
Societal shelter refers to transfers of  messages, norms, lifestyles, ideologies, myths and 
ritual systems between the central and the peripheral nation. Cultural relationships are 
important in order to avoid isolation and seek acknowledgement though these relations, 
i.e. the significant of  being part of  a wider societal community and its associated benefits. 
In these connections, it is important to bear in mind that shelter may involve various 
costs for the small state (Bailes & Thorhallsson 2013). However, this price may never be 
higher than the gains it receives: otherwise one cannot refer to this as shelter. Also, one 
cannot claim that an act or an event stemming from foreign influences was a form of  
shelter if  it was only beneficial for the small state’s elites.  
With its limited scope, this paper does not seek to trace all aspects of  Iceland’s 
external relations during this important period in its history. Instead, it will make an 
attempt to examine particular features of  Iceland’s foreign relations and place them 
within the shelter theory. On the other hand, in taking Iceland’s external relations as 
a focus for tracing the country’s development, it tries to escape the overwhelming 
emphasis on the country’s quest for independence and sovereignty which dominated 
the historical literature for most of  the 20th century. However, as already stated, most 
often both costs and benefits are associated with external relations, which need to be 
taken into consideration. 
Gradually, Icelanders requested and gained greater autonomy from the mid-19th 
century onwards. The Althingi (the national parliament) was restored in 1843; the 
dependency was granted a constitution in 1874 and gained home rule in 1904. It became 
a sovereign state under a joint monarchy in 1918 with the Danish-Icelandic Act of  
Union. Accordingly, the country was in full charge of  most of  its domestic affairs from 
the first years of  the new century and became an independent state in full charge of  its 
foreign affairs at the end of  the First World War. 
In the following sections of  this paper, we will address the three elements of  shelter 
defined in this introduction. First we will examine Iceland’s economic relations in the 
period. The second part will focus on Iceland’s political relations with Denmark and 
Britain and the third part deals with Iceland’s cultural and social relations with the 
outside world. Lastly, the concluding part will summarize the main findings of  the paper.
1. Economic shelter
This section examines whether Iceland’s external relations with its neighbouring states 
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of  cases in order evaluate to what extent these entailed benefits or costs for Icelandic 
society.  
From the 18th century onwards, expenses exceeded the profits that the Danish 
kingdom received from Iceland. Iceland received Danish subsidies for the bulk of  the 
period in order to run the state. In the 1870s, the contribution of  the Danish Treasury 
amounted to about a fifth of  total income in Iceland with the transfer of  fiscal powers 
to Iceland and a new tax system. These payments gradually decreased in line with a 
decision by the Danish government and were substantially less at the turn of  the century 
– both in absolute and in relative terms (the Icelandic economy had grown while the 
payments had decreased; Karlsson 2009, 221). In 1905, these payments accounted for 
around 5 per cent of  the Icelandic budget. Denmark stopped its direct payments into the 
Icelandic budget when Iceland became sovereign in 1918 (Júlíusson & Ísberg 2005, 277; 
Karlsson 2009, 294-301). These direct payments were in line with the shelter theory’s 
claim that protectorates are often in need of  subsidies from their protectors. 
 The trade monopoly ended in 1787 and restrictions on who could conduct trade 
in Iceland were loosened. However, this did not mean that trade was entirely free, as 
the changes only allowed subjects of  the Danish king (where monopoly trade was not 
practiced to trade in Iceland. There were high tariffs in place to ensure that merchants 
from outside the kingdom would not be able to compete with those from inside it 
(Karlsson 2008, 339). Furthermore, as a result of  its defeat in the Napoleonic wars, 
Denmark lost Norway into the hands of  Sweden in the peace settlements that followed. 
This effectively ended Iceland’s formal link with Norway which had lasted since 1262. 
Norway was now outside the kingdom and Norwegian merchants had to seek special 
licences to trade in Iceland. The island had thus lost its most important provider of  
timber, an essential product that could not be produced domestically. This shows 
how precarious it could be for Iceland to be part of  a closed trading system that was 
shrinking and be unable to turn to sources of  supply outside the kingdom for necessities 
(from 1821 timber imports of  foreign merchants (mainly Norwegian) were exempted 
from import levies). Consequently, the abolition of  the trade monopoly had a minuscule 
effect on the structure of  trade in Iceland and Danish merchants continued to dominate 
all areas of  foreign trade. 
Iceland continued to demand an end to restrictions on trade with foreign nations. 
These demands for freedom in trading activities were related to the increased demand for 
freedom on the political level that had started in the first half  of  the 19th century (Karlsson 
2008, 339-341). Increased national sentiments were reaching all areas of  society as the 
romantic ideology became more popular throughout the country. As a result, Danish 
activities and Danish influence in Iceland were increasingly seen as negative. Historically, 
the trade monopoly was seen as the epitome of  Danish oppression in Iceland. Iceland 
eventually had its demands met and in 1855 trade restrictions were lifted and Iceland was 
able to conduct business with countries outside the Danish kingdom. This development 






From the 1860s, the increased capital that found its way into the Icelandic economy 
through the sale of  livestock to Britain and work provided by Faroese fishermen and 
Norwegians on the island served to modernise the economy. For instance, from 1876 
onwards, the sale of  sheep started to give generous returns and for the two decades that 
followed it became an important source of  revenue for Icelandic farmers; between 1885 
and 1895 it accounted for around 15 per cent of  all exports from Iceland (Karlsson 2009, 
40-44; Blöndal 1982). The Danish government helped to keep the export line open by 
having the British government overturn its ban on the import of  Icelandic sheep in 
1882. However, in 1896 the ban was put in place again and the sale of  sheep to Britain 
was, for the most part, stopped (Karlsson 2009, 42). This new business opportunity had 
important effects not only for Icelandic farmers but also for the community at large. 
For instance, farmers founded their own cooperative movements and started to trade 
directly with Britain, instead of  relying on the Danish merchants, whose prices were 
30-40 per cent higher, for their imports  (Júlíusson & Ísberg 2005, 264-265; Karlsson 
2000, 243-247). 
Furthermore, fishermen from the Faroe Islands provided Icelanders with much better 
boats than they built themselves (Júlíusson & Ísberg 2005, 262-263) and the Norwegian 
whaling and herring industrial bases were probably the most technologically advanced 
workplaces on the island. Hence, Icelanders’ closest eastern neighbours provided an 
important backup in what was to become Iceland’s most important industry. Also, in 
around 1880, greater market access for saltfish on European markets allowed Icelanders 
to buy more ships. They managed to acquire a substantial fleet of  decked fishing vessels 
which were used for catching cod (Kjartansson 2010[2002], 38-39). 
However, more was needed to modernize the economy and in 1886 the first Icelandic 
bank, Landsbanki Íslands, was established. However, it did not have much capital to loan 
out; most of  its loans were to farmers and low-risk ventures and soon the credit that 
the bank could provide was considered to be insufficient for the economy (Karlsson 
2000, 289). Discussion arose on the need to have more foreign capital come into the 
country and in 1904 Íslandsbanki was established, with capital coming from Norway 
and Denmark. This was to become the main source of  venture capital in the Icelandic 
economy and the supply of  loan capital increased dramatically (Kjartansson 2010[2002], 
29). This was the prerequisite for the growth in the Icelandic fishing industry in the 
beginning of  the 20th century. 
With the establishment of  Landsbanki, an Icelandic currency was also created and 
the state put bills in circulation. The amount was kept moderate to ensure it would 
maintain its value (Karlsson 2009, 58). Currencies were generally redeemable in gold at 
this time, but this new currency was formally not, and was rather seen as an extension 
of  the Danish krone, and seen as an equivalent of  that currency. When Íslandsbanki 
was established it was also given the right to issue Icelandic crowns (krónur) that were 
redeemable in gold. The introduction of  this capital into the Icelandic economy was 
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the main means of  conducting business.  Loan capital was now available for prosperous 
business opportunities that had lain dormant for years. The currency benefited from 
its relations with the Nordic currency union that existed at the time and was in reality 
seen a part of  the Danish monetary system. This gave the Icelandic economy a certain 
amount of  credibility, ensured that prices and exchange rates remained stable and 
secured unhindered business transactions with other countries (Nordal 1998). Iceland 
thus benefited immensely from being part of  the Nordic monetary union.
The Great War led to the collapse of  the monetary system, based on a gold standard, 
that had been in place since the 1870s and as a result the monetary policies of  almost all 
European countries were in disorder. The Icelandic króna lost half  its value and price 
levels in Iceland rose dramatically during the war (Helgason 2002, 83). Iceland persisted 
in maintaining the equal exchange rate with the Danish krone, which was, however, 
no longer viable. In 1922 it was forced to devalue the króna by 23 per cent against the 
Danish krone. This marks the start of  an independent monetary policy in Iceland and 
was only the first of  many devaluations of  the króna.
The Icelandic króna continued to depreciate against other currencies in 1923 and 
1924. The Danish krone was no longer the main currency used by Icelanders in their 
foreign trade. This role had been taken over by the British pound. In 1925 – after a 
short period of  a floating exchange rate – Icelanders decided to seek shelter for their 
currency by pegging the Icelandic króna to the British pound, an arrangement which 
would last for 14 years (the longest period of  monetary stability in Iceland’s history; 
Nordal 2002). The pound had been the principal currency of  the gold standard, but was 
losing its stability and in 1931 Britain abandoned the gold standard and the pound was 
devalued. The peg of  the Icelandic króna, and other Nordic currencies, to the pound 
was maintained through all this, so the value of  the Icelandic króna fluctuated in the 
same manner as the pound. In 1939, the peg of  the króna to the pound was abandoned 
and the króna was devalued again – this time by 18 per cent. Later the same year, a 
shelter for the currency was sought again, this time by pegging the króna to the US 
dollar, and this was maintained until 1949. The Icelandic króna has a history of  constant 
devaluations and has depreciated by 99.95 per cent compared to the Danish krone since 
1939 (Gylfason 2009). 
Foreign capital and Danish grants, subsidies and technology opened the way to 
advancement in Icelandic society at the turn of  the century. For instance, this was the 
case of  the project to bring telegraph technology to Iceland. The introduction of  the 
telegraph to the peripheral community in Iceland was immensely important. Messages 
that previously had taken up to three weeks to reach their destination in Europe could 
now be sent in a matter of  minutes. This was important for merchants, who were now 
able monitor prices on the Continent more easily and make offers and payments through 
the banks, by telegraph (Kjartansson 2010[2002], 29-33). 
This project was soon followed by other projects which were all more or less 
supported by the Danish government with loans from Danish banks and carried out by 






in Reykjavik by constructing waterworks for the town; they cost almost four times the 
annual revenues of  Reykjavik. In 1911, a Danish bank provided a loan and a Danish 
firm provided the know-how and the equipment needed to carry out a construction of  
a harbour in Reykjavik – the main trading post on the island. Prior to this, ships had 
been forced to cast anchor outside Reykjavik and transport their goods ashore in smaller 
boats or on rafts. The harbour made an immense difference when it opened in 1917 
(Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 176-180). 
 Danish banks were willing to provide the Icelandic state with capital for these 
projects – loans at reasonable rates that had 40-50 year maturities. Without these funds, 
Iceland would not have been able to take on projects of  this magnitude. In line with 
shelter theory, this access to foreign capital from Danish banks can be seen as help from 
an external financial authority that allowed Iceland to undertake necessary projects for 
the further development of  its economy. 
The Icelandic economy was in an upswing at the beginning of  the 20th century. Fishing 
had taken over as the most important industry in the country and new technology had 
modernised the country and moved it closer to its trading partners. This was largely due 
to the liberal policies that had prevailed in the world economy in the 19th century and up 
until the First World War (see, for example, O’Brien & Williams 2007). 
The First World War changed the nature of  the international economy and had an 
immense impact on the Icelandic economy. Denmark was neutral in the war; however, 
Britain wanted to close off  the possibility of  necessities being sold from Denmark to 
Germany and thus placed an embargo on shipments going to Denmark (Kjartansson 
2010[2002], 54-55). It also took measures to stop exports of  herring from Iceland to 
Norway as it feared it would be transported there from to Germany, via Denmark or 
Sweden (Jensdóttir 1980). In 1914, around 40 per cent of  Iceland’s exports were to 
Denmark, and 40 per cent of  its imports were from that country, so the impact of  
this embargo was devastating for the Icelandic economy (Karlsson 2009, 294). This 
clearly indicates the importance of  a cost-benefit analysis of  the relationship between 
protectorates and dependencies.
In 1916, Iceland made a trade agreement with Britain concerning the import of  fish 
and other Icelandic products to Britain, which saw this deal as an instrument in securing 
access to fish for itself  while also limiting the supply for the opposing camp. Under the 
agreement, Britain committed itself  to buying all the main Icelandic export products 
at a fixed price and to ensure the export of  coal, salt and other necessities to Iceland 
(Jensdóttir 1980). The Icelandic government handled the negotiations and signing of  
this trade agreement itself, as the British government felt that Denmark, which formally 
was in charge of  foreign affairs, was not in a position to do so (Karlsson 2009, 291-294). 
As in the Napoleonic wars 100 years earlier, Britain decided to provide Iceland with 
economic shelter during wartime that would allow Iceland to continue selling its exports 
while markets on the Continent were closed and, more importantly, it provided Iceland 
with essential imports during this time. On neither occasion did Britain show any effort 
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Iceland and make them more permanent. It is thus apparent that clear incentives are 
needed in order for large entities to be willing to provide shelter for small states/entities 
in the international system. 
The Danish and Icelandic markets were one and the same, as there were no tariffs in 
place between them up until 1918. Accordingly, Iceland, as part of  the Danish kingdom, 
had tariff-free access to a larger market and, in that respect, received shelter from the 
Danish market. However, this was not the most suitable market for Iceland’s export 
products. After the First World War, Danish shelter no longer took the form of  an 
entrepôt for Icelandic exports on their way to their final destinations or providing access 
to its domestic market for Icelandic products. At the end of  the war in 1918, Iceland 
had greatly reduced its exports to Denmark, the proportion having fallen to 27 per cent 
of  total exports from Iceland (Karlsson 2009, 294). Nonetheless, Denmark was still an 
integral part of  Iceland’s trade policy and provided Iceland with essential assistance. The 
connection with Denmark helped in obtaining access for Icelandic exports, as Denmark 
handled Iceland’s foreign affairs and thus made trade agreements on its behalf  (see, for 
example, Thorsteinsson 1992, 101-114). In the period 1921-1930, around 50 per cent of  
Iceland’s exports went to Southern Europe (Magnússon 1993, 134-135). The closing of  
the Spanish market in 1936, because of  the civil war, resulted in greater diversification 
of  export markets; in 1938, 9 per cent of  Iceland’s exports went to the USA, 16 per cent 
to Germany and 21 per cent to Britain (Björnsson 1952, 225); in 1939, 10 per cent went 
to Denmark. Hence, Denmark continued to provide Iceland with essential economic 
shelter by providing access to other markets. 
2. Political shelter
This section will focus on a number of  aspects of  political relations between Denmark 
and Britain, on the one hand, and Iceland, on the other, in order to analyse whether 
the case of  Iceland supports the shelter theory’s claim that a small state/entity needs 
military and diplomatic backing from a larger state or states in order to prosper. Until the 
Act of  Union in 1918 Iceland had been a part of  Denmark’s foreign and security policy 
and could not hold an independent position in these matters. However, Icelanders were 
always in considerable contact with non-Danes, despite disapproval from the Danish 
authorities.  In the period under study, Britain had emerged as a superpower and the 
North Atlantic was within its sphere of  influence, which resulted in increased contacts 
between Iceland and Britain. 
Iceland proclaimed its perpetual neutrality in Article 19 of  the Act of  Union. 
Denmark took on the responsibility of  announcing this position of  Iceland to other 
nations. This declaration was in reality an extension of  the neutrality policy that the 
Scandinavian countries had pursued for decades and had served them well in the First 
World War (Jónsson 1989, 209). Apart from that, Iceland’s capabilities were very weak; 
the country had a tiny population and also lacked the financial means to establish its own 
defences. Historically, Iceland had never taken any part in its own defences and always 






Initially, there were no international agreements that set out the rights and duties of  
neutral countries in war and regulated their relations with warring countries. However, 
in 1856, an agreement that stated the rights and obligations of  neutral states in war 
was signed (Holbraad 1991). Neutrality had become a legitimate and realistic policy to 
pursue and small states, such as Denmark, that lacked the capabilities to take part in the 
power-play between the larger European states, saw it as their best option to survive in 
this system. By declaring neutrality, Iceland was, in a sense, relying on other states to 
respect the norms regarding neutrality and resist attacking a small and defenceless state, 
such as Iceland. These – alongside the peripheral position of  the country – were the best 
defensive options for the country at this time. 
After the Napoleonic Wars, the Danish kingdom was bankrupt and defenceless. 
Its capabilities to maintain control over its dependencies in the North Atlantic were 
seriously weakened. The North Atlantic was now de facto under Britain’s dominance 
(Þorsteinsson 1976, 144). However, Britain had little interest in annexing Iceland, until 
the Second World War. It was considered too costly to maintain a permanent presence 
in the country and also unnecessary as the country was already within Britain’s sphere of  
influence and Britain could in reality act as it wished in relation to Iceland (Agnarsdóttir 
1993, 176-178). In a sense, Iceland continued to be a Danish dependency after the 
Napoleonic wars because Britain approved of  that arrangement. Some historians have 
argued that Britain did not want Sweden to acquire the North Atlantic dependencies – 
Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland – after the war and thus included an article in 
the Treaty of  Kiel securing Danish control over the North Atlantic dependencies (Gad 
1979; Agnarsdóttir 1989; Þorsteinsson & Jónsson 1991). Others argue that Sweden did 
not request these islands since it did not have any interesting in them (e.g. Feldbæk 1998). 
Britain was the guarantor of  Iceland’s neutrality both in the Napoleonic wars and in the 
First World War and to the extent that Iceland had shelter in wartime, it came from 
Britain, not from Denmark. Any plans by foreign powers to increase their influence in 
Iceland or any effort to take over the island had to take into account the British response 
to such a move (Helgason 2008, 113). In that respect, Iceland found shelter in Britain’s 
sphere of  influence, especially in the latter part of  the period when Iceland’s peripheral 
geographical position did not provide the same buffer against foreign powers as it had 
done in previous centuries.  
In 1938, the Nordic states reiterated their neutrality and signed a set of  neutrality 
rules in an attempt to avoid involvement in a new major European war (Scott 1950, 
282). On the other hand, it became evident in the Second World War that the neutrality 
of  the Nordic countries was no longer respected by the European powers and both 
Denmark and Iceland were occupied by foreign powers. Britain invaded Iceland as soon 
as it though it was of  importance for it during a time of  war. The norms and rules of  
neutrality no longer prevailed for the Nordic states. Iceland’s neutrality policy had failed 
to protect the country. However, it can comfortably be argued that Britain sheltered 
Iceland from Nazi occupation. 
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throughout our period. The only defence expense for Denmark in relation to Iceland 
was that each summer a ship was sent to Iceland as a coastal guard (Karlsson 2008, 
280). Historically, European nations had exploited the rich fishing grounds surrounding 
Iceland. Denmark tried to the best of  its ability to guard Iceland’s territorial waters from 
foreign fishermen. However, this proved to be immensely difficult and it became evident 
that Denmark lacked the capability to provide Iceland with the military or diplomatic 
backing that the country sought – despite good intentions. Denmark did not possess the 
political power – military or diplomatic – to persuade other nations to respect Iceland’s 
claims to its territorial waters.  
Foreigners had for centuries been prohibited from fishing in Icelandic waters. In the 
monopoly trade era, this was mainly done in order to protect the commercial interests 
of  Danish merchants, and the trading system. However, the ban was extended when the 
trade monopoly ended and it was stated that ‘no foreigner was allowed to fish in Icelandic 
waters’ (Thorsteinsson 1992, 38). At this point the territorial waters were considered to 
extend 16 nautical miles from land (ibid.). As the 19th century progressed the number of  
foreign ships fishing in Icelandic waters increased and their operators refused to accept 
the 16-nautical-mile territorial limit and the closing of  fjords and harbours in Iceland. 
Larger European powers pressured the Danish government into making concessions 
in these matters. Due to its inability to patrol the 16-mile Icelandic limit, the Danish 
government reduced the territorial waters down to 4 nautical miles in 1859, hoping that 
this would be respected by foreign fishing vessels. It also started to show more force in 
its efforts to defend the fishing grounds from vessels that did not abide by the rules, and 
numerous British vessels were confiscated and their operators fined for breaching the 
territorial limit (Þór 1982). Nonetheless, the British government continued to pressure 
the Danish government to concede further reductions of  territorial waters and to give 
British fishermen docking rights in Icelandic ports. Eventually, in 1901, an agreement 
was signed between the Danish and British governments by which the limit of  Iceland’s 
territorial waters was set at 3 nautical miles, as the British government had insisted on 
for years, but fjords and bays were to be partially closed to British vessels (Thorsteinsson 
1992, 37-51). Foreign fishing grew considerably in the wake of  this agreement, to the 
Icelanders’ dismay. In the period 1919-1938, Icelanders took only roughly one-third of  
the demersal fish catches in the waters off  Iceland. The Icelandic fishing grounds were 
important to the British, as is shown by the fact that the total British catches in the 
Icelandic grounds during the 1919-1938 period were more than twice the total catch 
made by the British distant-water fleet on all the other fishing grounds combined (Þór 
1995, 56-107).
Britain’s determination in pursuing increased access to Icelandic fishing grounds 
shows that being in such close proximity to the empire brought not only benefits: 
there were also costs and one of  them was the British demand to have access to the 
rich fishing grounds surrounding Iceland. Denmark lacked the capacity to protect 
Icelandic waters and this dispute shows that Iceland was clearly within Britain’s sphere 






With the agreement of  1901, Britain had secured more or less what it always sought 
concerning access to Icelandic fishing grounds. The agreement was in place for the next 
50 years and has, in Icelandic historiography, often been considered as an illustration 
of  Denmark’s indifference in defending Iceland’s interests (Þorsteinsson & Jónsson 
1991, 310; Thorsteinsson 1992, 50). However, it is perhaps more an illustration of  the 
asymmetry in power between Britain and Denmark at this point. Denmark was unable 
to provide its dependency with shelter and, accordingly, protected its own interests.
The Act of  Union of  1918 granted Iceland full autonomy in its foreign affairs. 
However, the countries agreed that Denmark should handle Iceland’s foreign affairs 
and, thus, spare Iceland the great expense of  running its own foreign service. Iceland 
was in a position to run an independent foreign policy if  it wished to do so, and for the 
most part it did. Its administration was weak and in that respect it was highly influenced 
by Danish foreign policy.  However, the Act of  Union stated that Iceland could send out 
its own envoy on missions that were especially important for Iceland, if  it wished, and 
was only asked to notify the Danish foreign minister if  this were the case. Such an envoy 
would have to be funded by Iceland. Thus, Iceland could at any time implement its own 
foreign policy and could take part on an ad hoc basis in matters that were important for 
the country. Iceland was bound by all prior agreements that had been made by Denmark 
and concerned Iceland. However, after the validation of  the Act of  Union, international 
agreements made by Denmark would not take effect in Iceland unless they were also 
signed by the Icelandic government.  
In the 1920s and the 1930s, trade agreements between countries became increasingly 
important in order to limit the effects of  tariffs and other barriers to foreign trade. 
Hence, Iceland made numerous trade agreements in the years between the wars, ‘most-
favoured-nation’ agreements under which the countries in question agreed that they 
would always enjoy the best terms of  trade that were being offered by the other at any 
given time. Usually it was the Danish government that decided to make a trade agreement 
with another country and then it would offer Iceland to join in on the agreement, or 
Denmark would make a separate agreement on Iceland’s behalf  (Thorsteinsson 1992, 
101). It is safe to assume that, through its connection with the Danish kingdom, Iceland 
was able to make numerous favourable trade agreements that it otherwise would most 
likely not have been able to make.  
Tariffs were not the only barrier to trade in the inter-war period. In the 1930s, 
countries increasingly demanded a system of  equal exchange in foreign trade, with the 
aim that there would be a balance of  trade between trading partners. Thus, if  Iceland 
wanted to export products to a given market it was obliged, according to this system, 
to import products for the same amount from that country. The trade agreements had 
clauses that stated the quantity of  a given product that could be imported/exported. 
This was potentially problematic for Iceland, which exported a large proportion of  its 
products to markets in Southern Europe while its imports came from other markets, 
such as Scandinavia, Britain and Germany. In this situation it was highly beneficial for 
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considered to be a part of  Denmark’s and it was thus Denmark’s equal exchange account 
that balanced the trade. For example, this was the case with the trade negotiations 
between Denmark and Italy in 1938-1940. Iceland was allowed to export fish to Italy 
for a certain amount that would constitute part of  Denmark’s equal-exchange account 
and balanced through Denmark’s trade with Italy (Thorsteinsson 1992, 110). Denmark 
also agreed to increase its imports from certain countries in order for Iceland to be 
able to export fish to those countries. This was the case with Poland: Denmark agreed 
to increase its imports of  Polish coal so that Poland would agree on a trade deal with 
Iceland. These agreements were negotiated by Denmark and they show the importance 
for Iceland of  access to the Danish Foreign Service.
Finally, Iceland’s capacity to handle its own foreign affairs grew steadily in the inter-
war period. The first Icelandic embassy was established in Copenhagen in 1920 as part 
of  the Act of  Union.   Iceland had trade consultants who had the position of  attachés 
in some Danish embassies in Europe, with diplomatic status and facilities within the 
Danish embassies (Thorsteinsson 1992). In 1930 – when Iceland celebrated the 1000th 
anniversary of  the establishment of  its parliament, the Althingi – there was discussion 
of  whether Iceland should join the League of  Nations, and thus take on a more active 
role in foreign policy as a sovereign state. However, a majority of  parliamentarians felt 
that Iceland’s declaration of  perpetual neutrality was sufficient and that membership of  
the LN was redundant in that light (Þorsteinsson & Jónsson 2001, 366). The feeling was 
that Denmark would look after Iceland’s interests at the LN – as well as in other fields 
concerning foreign policy – and that membership would be too costly; that Iceland 
lacked the human resources and expertise needed for membership; and that Iceland 
would have no political gains from such a move (Valdimarsson 1993). Thus, Iceland 
continued, consciously, to rely on Denmark – and the shelter it provided – in many 
areas of  its foreign policy. Denmark was in a way a ‘guardian’ of  Iceland’s foreign policy. 
However, after the German invasion of  Denmark in 1940, Iceland took full control of  
its foreign policy since its relations with Copenhagen had been severed. 
3. Societal shelter
In 1815, as soon as the Napoleonic Wars ended, relations between Iceland and Denmark 
were re-established and Copenhagen’s place as Iceland’s cultural capital reached new 
heights. New communications and transportation technology made the transfer of  
messages, norms, lifestyles and ideologies much easier and transformed centre-periphery 
relations.
Iceland’s relations with the outside world were channelled through Copenhagen and 
became, in the era of  monopoly trade, increasingly one-dimensional (Thorhallsson & 
Joensen 2014). Contact maintained by Danish merchants became almost the sole channel 
of  passenger transport and postal communications, as Iceland had no independent fleet 
or separate guarantee of  services of  any kind. The Danish kingdom established regular 
postal shipments between Denmark and Iceland after the trade monopoly was abolished 






sparse, the ships were ill-suited for passengers, and the kingdom chartered them from 
merchants who often refused to transport the goods that Icelanders wanted to ship 
between the countries. On the other hand, there was one change that the Danish packet 
ships brought in the beginning: unlike the merchant ships, the packet ships sailed to 
Iceland in the autumn and back to Denmark in the spring. Thus, news could arrive 
from the Continent in autumn, and not only in spring, as had previously been the case. 
In 1839, a group of  merchants and Icelandic officials bought their own ship, with the 
support from the Danish government, which wanted Icelanders to become more self-
sufficient. This was the first time since the Middle Ages that Icelanders themselves 
owned a ship that could sail to the Continent (Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 25). 
On the other hand, it was not until 1852 that scheduled sailings between Iceland and 
the rest of  Europe became more frequent, rising to four times a year – one of  them to 
Liverpool, which created new opportunities for Icelanders to access the British market. 
Then in 1858 a steamship, the Victor Emanuel, started to sail to Iceland. It was larger and 
safer than the old schooners and could sail to Iceland all year round. This had immense 
impact on Icelandic society; the country was now in more or less constant contact with 
the outside world. It received news from the Continent more frequently and steamships 
were also used to transport goods for merchants, who were thus no longer forced to 
buy large quantities of  goods and store them over the winter, but could buy according 
to demand. This allowed them to increase the variety of  products on sale and made the 
running of  businesses in Iceland much more efficient (Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 30-38). 
These efforts to increase transportation to Iceland and improve the island’s 
communications with the outside world were all supported by the Danish government 
in one way or another. The government subsidised these efforts and rented ships from 
Danish businessmen which were used for the services to Iceland. On other occasions, 
the government provided military ships that maintained communications with Iceland, 
transporting people, goods and mail. According to the Status Act (stöðulög) of  1871, 
postal services were to become a domestic matter that Iceland should pay for from its 
own budget. However, an exemption was made and Denmark continued to finance the 
postal transport between the countries (Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 43). 
Increased frequency of  shipping to Iceland was essential for the small villages that 
were emerging on the coast and kept them in contact with the European continent and 
the British Isles in the 19th century. At the turn of  the century, more companies started 
to sail to Iceland and there was some competition between them. These companies also 
sailed to other harbours, thus introducing more variety into Iceland’s foreign contacts 
(Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 44-45). These communications, alongside new technology, 
such as the telephone, enabled Icelanders for the first time to follow current events in 
their neighbouring states, as has been discussed in previous sections.
After the Napoleonic Wars, almost all new agricultural technology and knowledge 
introduced in Iceland can be traced directly to the efforts made by the Danish government 
to modernise Iceland’s agriculture. In 1817, the Royal Danish Agricultural Society (det 
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to study in Denmark for three years and learn the agricultural methods used there. In 
the coming decades, farmers would go to Denmark with the support of  the Danish 
government to learn new methods in agricultural production which they taught to 
their countrymen. In the 1830s the first Icelandic veterinarian received his licence in 
Denmark. Also, Icelandic women travelled to Denmark to learn about the production 
of  dairy products and new methods in the handling of  milk (Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 
410-411). 
In the latter half  of  the century, the Danish government continued to support 
Icelandic agriculture and even supported farmers to study agronomy in Norway and 
Scotland. For example, the Royal Danish Agricultural Society awarded scholarships to 
Icelanders, supported Icelandic and Danish experts who travelled around the country 
to teach new techniques and methods in agriculture; it sent seeds and plants, gave 
farmers new tools, sent new domestic animals to Iceland, such as pigs, in an effort to 
increase the variety in animal farming and sent experts to oversee, for instance, irrigation 
projects (Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 410-415). On other fronts, agricultural schools were 
established on the Danish model; the introduction of  dairy farms at the turn of  the 
century followed in the footsteps of  developments in Danish agriculture and the 
knowledge acquired there in the latter half  of  the 19th century; slaughterhouses were 
established on the Danish model and the butchers learned their trade in Denmark and, 
lastly, the Danish government also supported soil reclamation and reforestation projects 
in Iceland (Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 415-428). 
In the 19th century, the improvements that were made in the health-care system in 
Iceland came from Denmark. These efforts were supported and paid for by Denmark. 
Most doctors in Iceland received their diplomas at the University of  Copenhagen – a 
leading university in Europe - but not many persons pursued this career due to low 
pay and immense workloads. In 1862, the Director of  Health (landlæknir) re-established 
a domestic school in medicine, to address the growing demand for doctors, and 13 
students qualified from it in about 15 years (Karlsson 2008, 230). In 1802, vaccination 
was tried for the first time in Iceland. Cows were used to produce the serum that was 
then used in vaccination for humans. This innovation entered Iceland through Denmark 
and in 1811 an Act was passed in Denmark – which was applicable to Iceland - that 
made it mandatory for the government to provide vaccination for smallpox to the 
general public (Jóhannesson 1950, 182). Smallpox epidemics – which historically had 
ravaged the country – were no longer the same threat. 
In 1847, a Danish doctor was sent to Vestmannaeyjar to deal with the high infant 
mortality in the islands (see Garðarsdóttir 2002, 108-121). He managed to reduce 
the mortality rate from 74 per cent in the period from 1827-1847 to 25 per cent by 
introducing disinfection and hygiene in connection with childbirth (Júlíusson & Ísberg 
2005, 300-301). In the middle of  the century, transfer of  knowledge from Denmark 
lowered the infant mortality rate in the country when doctors started to encourage 
women to breastfeed their new-borns. Furthermore, the state had, since 1760, supported 






of  Health, a school of  midwifery was established (Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 169). The 
Danish government not only paid for the education of  midwives, but also their salaries 
after their studies, as it did with other officials in Iceland. 
In 1898, the Oddfellow society in Denmark paid for and built a new leprosy hospital 
in Iceland which would serve until the 1940s, at which time leprosy had more or less been 
exterminated in the country. In 1895, missionaries of  the St. Josef  rule came to Iceland 
from Denmark and started to practice home nursing and poor relief  in Reykjavík. In 
1901 they started work on a hospital in Reykjavik which would serve as the country’s 
main hospital until the 1930s when the National Hospital was built. The Icelandic state 
thus managed to avoid using its own funds for building a hospital until the 1930s. A few 
small private hospitals had been built in the 19th century but these large hospitals were 
built with foreign funds and foreign knowledge for the benefit of  the general public in 
Iceland (Ísberg 2005; Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 163-168). 
The University of  Copenhagen was Iceland’s institute for higher education and 
there was a dramatic increase in the number of  students travelling to Copenhagen in 
our period. In the 19th century, 435 Icelanders studied at the university (the number 
rose steadily until 1918) compared with around 500 Icelanders from 1550 to 1800 
(Friðriksson & Þór 2013). All these students benefited from the free board and lodging 
offered by the Danish government from 1579 to 1918. 
Also, many Icelanders travelled to Copenhagen to learn various crafts, including 
carpentry, photography, machine construction, tailoring, blacksmithing, printing, 
painting, gold- and silversmithing, watchmaking and shoemaking. Skills in these trades 
were important for the further development of  the society and an integral part of  its 
move towards modernity. There are records of  680 Icelandic craftsmen travelling to 
Copenhagen to study in the years 1815-1915 – but this probably understates the true 
number (Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 306). Also, numerous Danish craftsmen travelled to 
Iceland to teach the local population new trades. Copenhagen was Iceland’s window to 
the world of  new crafts and trades and it actively promoted these skills to Icelanders. As 
a result, Danish influences could be seen in all areas of  Icelandic society, whether it was 
in house-building, machine skills, bakeries or barbershops, the knowledge and influences 
came from Denmark.  
Iceland, like other countries, was affected by international ideological currents in the 
period under study. Many international ideologies entered Iceland in the period, mostly 
through Denmark, and influenced Icelandic society. This was for example the case 
with romanticism, liberalism, nationalism, religious movements, temperance societies, 
organized youth societies, women’s rights movements, socialism and cooperative 
societies. Iceland developed at a slower pace than most other European entities in this 
period and as a result many of  the ideas promoted by the Enlightenment – such as 
education for the general public, industrial progress, humanitarianism, and belief  in the 
human spirit and technology – were still applicable in 19th-century Iceland and affected 
how other ideological currents were received in the country (Sigurðsson 2006).




Iceland’s External Affairs from the 
Napoleonic Era to the Occupation of 
Denmark: Danish and British shelter 
administration regularly sent recommendations to Iceland about what Acts regarding 
women’s rights had been passed and how they should be implemented on the island. 
The Icelandic women’s rights movement benefitted from the strength of  the Danish 
movement. The model for women’s schools came from Denmark and was funded by 
Danish private organizations and individuals (despite considerable opposition to such 
schools in Iceland; Friðriksson & Þór 2013, 397). In the 1890s, left-wing and liberal 
political views that emphasised women’s rights started to gain a foothold in Iceland. 
In 1915, women over the age of  40 were given suffrage. By 1921, a constitutional 
amendment had given all women and workers suffrage at the age of  25. This appears to 
have been in line with a demand made by the Danish government in the negotiations 
leading to the Act of  Union in 1918 (Styrkársdóttir 1994). 
Romanticism was at its height in the first half  of  the 19th century and as a result 
there was greater interest in the Nordic cultural heritage within the Danish kingdom. 
Copenhagen became, to an even larger degree than before, the place where the Icelandic 
cultural heritage was preserved. The state and private individuals sponsored research in 
the field and Icelandic students in Copenhagen were hired to read and transcribe old 
manuscripts. Also, the state supported the publication of  Icelandic literature and actively 
sought to promote Icelandic culture as the shared Nordic cultural heritage (Friðriksson 
& Þór 2013). All this was very important for the preservation of  Iceland’s language and 
medieval literature, and the development of  national identity in Iceland. For example, 
this attitude towards Iceland can be seen in the fact that Denmark never tried to force 
Icelanders to use Danish as their administrative or clerical language. Hence, Agnarsdóttir 
(2008) and Karlsson (2008, 280-285) argue that Icelandic language and culture was 
considered to be a great asset for the Danish kingdom which overshadowed the fact 
that the island did not return material profit for the kingdom.
From around 1830 and onwards, the Romantic ideology in Europe took on a more 
political form, as nationalism became more visible in public discourse. Furthermore, in 
this period, liberalism developed further the ideas expressed by the Enlightenment and 
together these ideas would have an immense impact on the development of  European, 
as well as Icelandic, society. Iceland’s move towards greater autonomy can be directly 
linked to the political developments taking place in Europe and within the Danish 
kingdom at the time (Karlsson 2000, 200-204). 
In the 19th century, liberalism never gained the same foothold in Iceland as it did in 
Denmark, though it became an integral part of  the independence discourse. In 1849, 
a new constitution was introduced in Denmark that gave Danish citizens extensive 
rights that they had previously not exercised. Due to disputes regarding the legal status 
of  Iceland within the Danish kingdom, this constitution did not immediately apply to 
Iceland. Thus there was no human rights legislation in Iceland until 1874 – when Iceland 
received its constitution from the King. Some of  the rights introduced in the Danish 
constitution were taken up ad hoc into Icelandic legislation in the meantime (Karlsson 
2008, 247). 






part of  the liberal modernisation that was taking place in Europe in the 19th century. 
For instance, it opposed allowing more freedom for working people in choosing where 
they lived, having the right to establish homes and freedom in marital issues, as it feared 
this would undermine its strong and dominant position in the society. Hálfdanarson 
(2007, 45-76) argues that Icelandic farmers (landowners) supported the independence 
struggle because they feared the diffusion of  liberal ideas from Denmark and wanted to 
protect the conservative societal structure on which their power was based. The pursuit 
of  greater national autonomy and independence was therefore in one sense a means by 
which to forestall the liberalization of  Iceland. The farmers managed to postpone many 
reforms that had been introduced elsewhere in the kingdom and, as a result, the general 
public did not have the same rights as existed in Iceland’s neighbouring states at the end 
of  the 19th century.
4. Conclusions
Our findings indicate that Iceland relied on its larger neighbours for modernization and 
prosperity. Also, it was in need of  political cover, in line with the shelter theory on the 
importance of  military and diplomatic support and the significance of  beneficial norms 
and rules of  the international system for small entities. On the other hand, outside 
assistance did not come without cost: Danish economic cover was highly costly at the 
beginning of  the period under study and Britain did more or less what it wanted in the 
North Atlantic, especially in times of  political crisis in Europe. Our findings indicate 
that political shelter can be highly costly for a small entity/state. The shelter theory 
has to acknowledge these costs and take them into account in its cost-benefit analysis. 
Iceland was at the mercy of  its larger neighbours, particularly when their political and 
economic interests were at stake. Accordingly, the paper also confirms the claim of  the 
small-state literature that small states rely on their larger neighbour for survival. 
Denmark’s willingness to provide the island with essential financial backup was 
fundamental in the modernization of  the society, providing the basis for economic 
improvements and enabling Iceland to manage itself  in the early 20th century. Iceland’s 
economic development - despite late industrialization - would have been even slower 
without this initial start capital. 
Societal relations with Copenhagen were of  fundamental importance in the 
preservation and evolution of  Icelandic culture and identity. These provided the 
foundation of  the modern society and led to the establishment of  the Icelandic state. 
Cultural relationships and transfer of  norms and knowledge are seen as important in 
order to avoid isolation and seek acknowledgement though these relations, according 
to Rokkan and Urwin’s theory on centre-periphery relationships in state-building 
in Western Europe. This illustrates the significance of  being part of  a wider societal 
community and its associated benefits.   
Furthermore, Denmark provided important political shelter in terms of  significant 
diplomatic support in guaranteeing trade agreements with other states until the 
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ruler, Denmark, to implement its foreign policy in the inter-war period was a forced 
choice necessitated by its limited administrative capacity and competence and economic 
resources. Moreover, Denmark led by example – confirming another typical claim of  
the literature on small states’ relations with their larger neighbours. For instance, this was 
the case with Iceland’s decision to follow other Nordic states’ stance on neutrality. The 
Nordic states were not in a formal alliance but their common declaration of  neutrality 
indicated a united front that was designed to strengthen their neutrality policy against 
potentially aggressive larger European neighbours. In declaring neutrality, Iceland sought 
cover in the prevailing norms of  the international system available at the time to small 
and defenceless states.  This – alongside the peripheral position of  the country – were 
the best defensive options for the country at this time. Accordingly, Iceland’s smallness 
played a crucial part in shaping its foreign policy strategy in the inter-war period. 
Britain guaranteed Iceland’s neutrality in the First World War, as it had done in 
the Napoleonic Wars, and its important connections with the outside world. Iceland 
could no longer seek security guarantees by allying itself  with the other Nordic states. 
Denmark had long passed its hayday, and Norway had done so a few centuries earlier. 
Denmark had been downgraded to the status of  a small European state and could not 
provide Iceland with political and economic cover in times of  crisis. Iceland had for 
a considerable time been within the British sphere of  influence. Britain provided the 
island with political and economic cover. Iceland’s strategic geographical location had 
undergone fundamental changes. Iceland was as much in need as ever of  secure shelter 
from a powerful international actor. It needed a reliable protector that would be able to 
reduce pre-crisis risk, assist with response in the event of  crisis and then with recovery 
measures. At the end of  our period under study, Iceland’s reliance on Britain was more 
obvious than ever before. 
Interestingly, Iceland’s increased autonomy and full independence did not have any 
impact on its need for political, economic and societal shelter. Importantly, the rules 
and norms of  the international system (in line with the shelter theory regarding political 
cover) in terms of  respect for nations’ autonomy were of  fundamental importance 
in Iceland’s quest for self-governance and, later, full independence. Iceland’s larger 
neighbours accepted its quest for self-governance, with the legitimatization of  the 
principle of  national self-determination. However, Iceland’s closest world power, Britain, 
did not hesitate to occupy the island when this suited its interests. Yet again, Iceland’s 
smallness and its relations with its most powerful neighbour determined its destiny.  
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